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Abstract
In practice, firms face a mass of scarce innovation projects. They choose a particular
research avenue towards which to direct their effort, but do not coordinate these choices.
This gives rise to coordination frictions. Our paper develops an expanding-variety endogenous
growth model to study the impact of these frictions on the economy. The coordination fail-
ure generates a mass of foregone innovation and reduces the economy-wide research intensity.
Both of these effects decrease the growth rate. Because of this, the frictions also amplify the
fraction of wasteful simultaneous innovation. A numerical exercise suggests that the impact of
coordination frictions on both the growth rate and welfare is substantial. This paper also an-
alyzes firm-level data on patents which provide an estimate of the severity of the coordination
problems and further evidence in favor of the hypothesis that research avenues are scarce.
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1 Introduction
Innovators have technological access to many distinct research avenues (ideas).1 At the
same time, (quasi) simultaneous innovation of the same idea by several researchers is a well-
documented empirical regularity.2 Thus, often many firms engage in an innovation race for
the exact same idea, i.e. research avenues are scarce. Furthermore, coordination of research
efforts by firms (firm A directs its effort towards project 1, firm B towards project 2, and
so on) is very unlikely in this setting because of two main reasons. First, the size of the
“market” for ideas makes coordination very hard to achieve. Second, such coordination
requires each firm to know the portfolio of research projects of all of its rivals. This is
particularly implausible in the current context given that firms actively employ secrecy as
an intellectual property protection mechanism.3
Motivated by these observations, we develop an expanding-variety endogenous growth
model that features scarce research avenues and lack of research effort coordination. Our
paper examines the impact of these coordination frictions on firms’ decision to undertake
R&D activities as well as their aggregate consequences. We also study the implications
of the frictions for the planner’s constraint-efficient allocation. Furthermore, we gauge the
importance of the coordination problems for growth and welfare in a numerical exercise.
Lastly, we analyze firm-level data on patents, which provide estimates for the severity of the
coordination frictions and further evidence in favor of the hypothesis that ideas are scarce.
In our model, R&D firms direct their research efforts towards a particular project out
of an endogenously determined mass of ideas. If innovated, each idea is transformed into
one new variety. Firms which secure a patent over a variety produce. We focus on the
symmetric equilibrium where firms use identical mixed strategies when directing their R&D
1For example, during 2015 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office granted more than quarter of a million
patents.
2Perhaps the most famous example is that of the Alexander Bell and Elisha Gray telephone controversy.
On February 14, 1876 Bell filed a patent application for the telephone and only hours later Gray submitted a
similar application for the exact same innovation. Lemley (2011) presents ample evidence that virtually every
important innovation from history has been simultaneously innovated. Cohen and Ishii (2005) documents
the same phenomenon in patent examples which are not limited to major innovations. Section six of this
paper details more recent examples.
3For a survey of the evidence see, for example, Hall et al. (2014).
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efforts, so as to highlight their inability to coordinate. Thus, each idea is innovated by a
random number of firms with mean equal to the tightness in the market for ideas (the ratio
of firms to ideas). Knowledge is cumulative — each innovated idea allows firms to “stand on
the shoulders of giants” and gain technological access to a number of new research projects.
This intertemporal spillover effect is the ultimate source of growth in our economy — an
expanding mass of ideas permanently alleviates future congestion problems, thus, reducing
the cost of discovering new varieties. Along the balanced growth path (BGP henceforth),
the growth rate of the economy is determined by the growth rate of the mass of ideas, which
is in turn endogenously determined by the market tightness and the coordination problems.
The frictions in our model have a direct impact on the growth rate. Firms cannot
coordinate their efforts, so they unintentionally gravitate towards the same research projects.
This leaves a mass of profitable ideas uninnovated each period. As a consequence the growth
rate of the decentralized frictional economy (DE henceforth) is reduced, as compared to a
hypothetical economy in which firms can coordinate their efforts (CE henceforth). At the
same time, due to a general equilibrium effect, the frictions amplify the fraction of wasteful
simultaneous innovation.4 Due to the lower growth rate firms discount future profit streams
less. This increases the value of holding a patent and, in equilibrium, induces more congestion
in the market for ideas. This higher congestion, in turn translates to a higher fraction of
wasteful innovation. Furthermore, for any market tightness, the coordination frictions reduce
firms’ probability of securing a monopoly position. Given a market tightness, the ratio of
innovations to ideas is the same for both the DE and the CE. In the DE, however, there is
a mass of foregone innovation. Hence, a lower fraction of these innovations are distinct and
as a consequence there is a lower number of patents to be distributed among firms. This
reduced probability of securing a patent induces firms to decrease their entry into the R&D
sector, leaving the DE with a lower R&D intensity (market tightness). As a result, the DE
growth rate is decreased even further.
The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient as compared to the second-best allocation (SB
4Since only one firm can obtain a patent over a particular variety, the R&D investment by all other rivals
who innovate simultaneously represents wasteful duplication of effort.
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henceforth). In addition to the usual appropriability externality, there are two others in the
model. First, due to the possibility of simultaneous innovation, there is a “business-stealing”
effect that leads to a congestion externality. The marginal R&D entrant finds innovation
profitable even if a rival has already directed its research efforts towards the corresponding
idea, as long as the entrant receives a patent for the innovation. In that event the rival
is denied a patent and the entrant effectively steals the monopoly rents. The planner, on
the other hand, finds the marginal entry beneficial only if no other firm has directed its
research effort towards the corresponding idea. That is, on the margin, she values only the
sole inventor. Thus, the congestion externality induces firms to over-invest as compared to
the SB level. Second, there is a learning externality — the planner values innovation in part
because it leads to an increase in the mass of ideas. Firms, on the other hand, do not have a
mechanism through which to appropriate these extra ideas so they do not value them. Thus,
in equilibrium the learning externality pushes firms towards under-investment as compared
to the SB level. The size of the congestion externality is larger than that of the learning one,
so implementing the SB requires the government to impose a tax on R&D spending.
The frictions in our model impact welfare negatively through two channels: they (i)
generate a mass of foregone innovation and (ii) amplify the fraction of wasteful innovation.
In the benchmark calibration, eliminating the frictions in the DE leads to a 13% welfare
gain (in consumption equivalent terms). The DE growth rate is only 2/3 of the CE one,
so the welfare cost of foregone innovation is 10.35%. Coordination problems increase the
fraction of wasteful innovation by 8pp (to 39%), which translates to a 2.65% welfare cost.
Moreover, if the planner could eliminated the frictions and assign the first-best allocation
(FB henceforth), she would achieve welfare 16.15% higher than that in the SB. However,
only 5.66pp of the gain is due to eliminating foregone innovation. This is because of two
reasons. First, the SB features a much smaller fraction of foregone innovation than the DE.
Second, removing the frictions in the SB reduces the fraction of wasteful duplication of effort
from 52% to 0 since the FB does not suffer from the over-investment present in CE.
Our paper also tests the hypothesis that ideas are scarce using firm-level data on patents
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granted between 1976 and 2006. Given the intuition from the theoretical model, if research
avenues are scarce, then an increase in the market tightness should be accompanied by a
decrease in each firm’s probability of securing a patent. To test this prediction, we combine
firm-level data on patents and firm characteristics with aggregate-level data on patents. We
find that the data provides strong support in favor of this prediction. Furthermore, our
analysis allows us to estimate the level of congestion in the market for ideas.
1.1 Relationship to the Literature
Our paper models firms’ choice of direction for their R&D efforts and the coordination
problems inherent in this decision. As such, it is related to a recent literature on economic
growth which emphasizes matching, and other, frictions in the innovation process (see, for
example, Perla and Tonetti (2014), Lucas and Moll (2014), Benhabib et al. (2014), Chiu et al.
(2015), and Akcigit et al. (2016)). The work here complements that literature by examining
a different source of friction. In particular, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first
growth paper to emphasize search frictions in the market for ideas which take the form of
a coordination failure. Previous growth models have focused instead on a search process
which takes the form of arrival rate of innovations, a McCall-type search for innovations, or
frictions in the market for innovations.5
The theoretical model in this paper differs from the existing literature on economic growth
in a number of additional dimensions. First, our analysis emphasizes firms’ choice of research
avenues by explicitly modeling the mass of available ideas. In particular, we make a dis-
tinction between potential innovations (ideas) and actual innovations.6 Second, our model
5For papers which feature search as arrival rate of innovations see, for example, Aghion and Howitt
(1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Klette and Kortum (2004). For papers that feature a McCall-
type search for heterogeneous technologies see, for example, Kortum (1997), Perla and Tonetti (2014), and
Lucas and Moll (2014). For papers which focus on frictions in the market for innovations see, for example,
Chiu et al. (2015) and Akcigit et al. (2016). It is worth noting that Chiu et al. (2015) and Akcigit et al.
(2016) do not make a distinction between ideas and innovations. In particular, the market for ideas in our
paper (firms searching for a potential R&D project) is different from the “market for ideas” in Chiu et al.
(2015) and Akcigit et al. (2016) where firms search for opportunities to trade the property rights over an
innovation.
6This is in contrast to the previous literature on economic growth (Jones, 1995, 2002; Jones and Kim,
2014; Chiu et al., 2015; Akcigit et al., 2016; Bloom et al., 2016) which has used ideas and innovations
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features a scarce mass of potential research projects such as, for example, Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Klette and Kortum (2004).7 Unlike those studies, our paper explicitly
models the decision of firms to direct their R&D activities and emphasizes the coordination
frictions inherent in this problem.8 Third, in contrast to the previous literature, this paper
features an endogenously determined mass of ideas. Fourth, in our paper firms compete for
ideas through their choice of research avenue. This competition is different than the compe-
tition firms face at the product market or the innovation race which the previous literature
has examined.9
Within the literature on industrial organization the two closest papers to ours are Kultti
et al. (2007) and Kultti and Takalo (2008) which also feature search frictions in the market
for ideas. In these papers there is the possibility of simultaneous innovation due to a match-
ing technology which is the same as the equilibrium one in our paper. Kultti et al. (2007)
and Kultti and Takalo (2008) focus on intellectual property rights in a partial equilibrium
framework with a fixed mass of ideas and without free entry into the innovation sector. In
contrast, our model focuses on a general equilibrium framework with growth, an endoge-
nously determined mass of ideas, and an endogenously determined market tightness through
free entry in the R&D sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the environment
and characterizes the decentralized equilibrium. Section three examines the social planner’s
second-best allocation. Section four highlights the impact of coordination frictions in our
model. Section five presents a numerical exercise. Section six details the empirical analysis.
Section seven concludes.
interchangeably.
7In contrast, some previous studies (Romer, 1990; Corriveau, 1994, 1998; Kortum, 1997) have examined
models which feature an abundance of research avenues, whereas some others (Aghion and Howitt, 1992;
Segerstrom et al., 1990) have examined models where a single avenue of research is available. For a recent
review of the literature see, for example, Aghion et al. (2014).
8In contrast, these papers do not focus on this decision and assume that firms can either perfectly
coordinate their efforts (Grossman and Helpman, 1991) or cannot choose the direction of their research
altogether (Klette and Kortum, 2004).
9See, for example, Segerstrom et al. (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Corriveau (1994), Corriveau
(1998), Aghion et al. (2005), and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012)
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2 The Economy
The environment is an augmented, discrete time version of the textbook model in Barro and
Sala-i Martin (2003) Chapter 6 (BSM henceforth). There are three types of agents — a
final good producer, a unit measure of consumers, and a continuum of R&D firms. The only
point of departure from BSM is in the R&D sector, so as to emphasize the novel features of
the model. In particular, R&D projects are scarce and R&D entrants can direct their efforts
towards a particular project, but they cannot coordinate their research activities.
2.1 Final Good Sector
The final good is produced by a single price taker, using the following technology
Yt = AL
1−λ
∫ Nt
0
Xλt (n)dn, 0 < λ < 1 (1)
where Yt is output, L is the fixed labor supply of households, Nt is the mass of intermediate
varieties, and Xt(n) is the amount of a particular variety n employed in production. The
price of the final good is normalized to unity. The final good firm faces a competitive market
for labor, which is hired at the wage wt, and a monopolistically competitive market for
varieties, where a unit of each variety n is bought at the price Pt(n). As in BSM, the firm’s
maximizing behavior yields the wage wt = (1− λ)Yt/L and the inverse demand function for
varieties Pt(n) = λAL
1−λXλ−1t (n).
2.2 R&D Sector
The novel features of our model are contained in the R&D sector of the economy. The
innovation process has three stages and makes a distinction between potential innovations
(ideas) and actual innovations (new varieties). At stage one, firms enter the R&D sector at
a cost η > 0 units of the final good. The mass of R&D entrants is denoted by µt and is
to be determined in equilibrium. At stage two firms direct their innovative effort towards
a particular R&D project from a finite mass νt of ideas. The choice is private knowledge
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and firms cannot coordinate their efforts. To capture this coordination failure, we follow
the previous literature on coordination frictions and focus on a symmetric equilibrium where
firms use identical mixed strategies.10 Ideas are identical and, if innovated, transform into
exactly one new variety. Innovation takes one period — a firm which enters at time t
innovates the chosen project at time t+1. Thus, the only source of uncertainty in our model is
the random realization of firms’ equilibrium mixed strategies — some ideas may be innovated
by many firms simultaneously, while others may not be innovated at all. Innovators apply
for a patent which grants perpetual monopoly rights over the variety. Each innovation is
protected by exactly one patent — if several firms simultaneously apply for the same patent,
then each has an equal chance of receiving it. Stage three is as in BSM. Patent holders supply
their variety in a monopolistically competitive market. Both the average and marginal costs
of production are normalized to unity so profits are given by pit(n) = (Pt(n) − 1)Xt(n).
Furthermore, the value of holding a monopoly over a variety n at time t, Vt, is given by
Vt(n) =
∞∑
i=t+1
ditpii(n)
where dit is the stochastic discount factor.
A necessary condition for positive long term growth in our model is that the mass of ideas,
νt, grows at a positive rate. We follow Kortum (1997) and Romer (1990), among others, and
assume that knowledge is cumulative. Patenting an idea at time t allows firms to “stand
on the shoulders of giants” and gain access to M > 1 new research avenues at t + 1. Thus,
unlike previous growth models, in ours the mass of ideas is endogenously determined. Once
an idea is innovated, it is no longer a potential R&D project and so it is removed from the
pool.11 Thus the net increase in the pool of ideas from innovating one new variety is M − 1.
Due to the frictions in our model, there is a chance that an idea is not innovated, i.e. no
firm directs its research efforts towards the idea in question. Let us denote this probability
10See, for example, Julien et al. (2000), Burdett et al. (2001), and Shimer (2005).
11Each innovation is protected by a patent, so no firm has an incentive to imitate at a late date. Thus,
the idea no longer represents a profitable R&D project and as a consequence it is no longer in νt+1.
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by ζt, then the law of motion for ideas is given by
νt+1 = νt + (1− ζt)(M − 1)νt
As each innovated idea is transformed into a new variety, it follows that
Nt+1 = Nt + (1− ζt)νt
2.3 Households
Consumers are endowed with a discount factor β and a per-period utility function U(Ct) =
lnCt. They can save by accumulating assets, which in this economy are claims on inter-
mediate firms’ profits. In particular, households have access to a mutual fund that covers
all intermediate good firms. Let at denote the amount of shares held by the representative
household at the beginning of period t. Each period all profits are redistributed as dividends,
thus, the total assets of the household entering period t are at
∫ Nt
0
(pit(n) +Vt(n))dn. At time
t households decide on the shares they would like to hold at t + 1, at+1. The mutual fund
at that time covers all firms which exist at time t+ 1, Nt+1. Hence, the household’s budget
constraint is given by
at+1
∫ Nt+1
0
Vt(n)dn = at
∫ Nt
0
(pit(n) + Vt(n))dn+ wtL− Ct
The household’s first order conditions imply the Euler equation below
1
Ct
=
β
Ct+1
(∫ Nt+1
0
(pit+1(n) + Vt+1(n))dn
)(∫ Nt+1
0
Vt(n)dn
)−1
The intuition is standard — consumers equate the marginal utility at time t with the dis-
counted marginal utility at time t+ 1, times the gross rate of return on their assets.
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2.4 Equilibrium
We restrict the analysis to a set of parameter values which ensures that firms have an
incentive to enter the R&D sector, i.e. η ≤ (1 − λ)β(λ2A)1/(1−λ)L/[λ(M − β)]. The usual
profit maximization of intermediate good firms along with the demand function imply that
Pt(n) = 1/λ and X := Xt(n) = (λ
2A)1/(1−λ)L. Thus, every intermediate good firm yields
the same per period profits of pi := pit(n) = X(1 − λ)/λ. This implies that Vt := Vt(n) =∑∞
i=t+1 ditpi — every firm is equally valuable. Since each variety carries the same amount
of profits, the stage two equilibrium strategy of firms is to direct their R&D effort towards
each idea with equal probability.12 This implies the following equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1. The number of firms which direct their R&D effort towards a particular
idea follows a Poisson distribution with mean θt, where θt ≡ µt/νt.
A proof is in Appendix C. The random realization of firms’ equilibrium strategies gives
rise to the standard urn-ball matching technology.13 The ratio of firms to ideas, θt, represents
the tightness in the market for ideas and captures the level of congestion in the economy. An
R&D firm becomes a monopolist with probability
∑∞
m=0 Pr( exactly m rival firms direct their
research effort towards the particular idea)/(m+1) =
∑∞
m=0 e
−θtθmt /(m+1)! = (1−e−θt)/θt.
This probability captures the business-stealing effect in the model. An innovator faces the
threat that a rival directs its research efforts towards the exact same idea. If that is the
case, then the rival has a chance of securing a patent over the innovation, effectively stealing
the innovator’s monopoly rents. Thus, higher congestion increases the expected number of
rivals, which lowers each firm’s chance of securing a patent. Given free entry, it follows that
η =
1− e−θt
θt
Vt (2)
The level of congestion firms are willing to tolerate is governed by the net present value of
12We follow the literature on coordination frictions (see, for example, Julien et al. (2000)) and derive the
optimal behavior for firms when there are finite number of ideas. The result is then obtained by taking the
limit as νt →∞, keeping the ratio µt/νt constant.
13See, for example, Wolinsky (1988), Lu and McAfee (1996), Julien et al. (2000), and Burdett et al.
(2001).
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profits and the entry cost. Higher profits (or lower costs) induce firms to tolerate a lower
chance of securing a monopoly position and as a consequence higher tightness. The matching
technology implies that ζt = e
−θt . Hence,
νt+1 = νt + (1− e−θt)(M − 1)νt
Nt+1 = Nt + (1− e−θt)νt
Furthermore, the frictions in our model induce an economy-wide varieties production
function (New Varieties = (1 − e−Rt/(ηνt))νt) which is concave in the aggregate research
effort, Rt ≡ ηµt. A higher aggregate research effort is associated with higher mass of firms
which, in turn, increases the congestion in the market. Thus, the marginal entrant has a
higher chance of duplicating an innovation, rather than innovating a distinct new variety.
In particular, the higher level of congestion increases the fraction of wasteful duplicative
innovation, ω ≡ 1− (1− e−θt)/θt.14
Since all firms receive the same profits, the Euler equation simplifies to
Vt = β
Ct
Ct+1
(
pi + Vt+1
)
(3)
Hence, the stochastic discount factor is dit = β
iCt/Ct+i. Given consumers’ budget constraint,
free entry, and the law of motion for varieties it is straightforward to derive the economy-wide
resource constraint which takes the usual form — output is distributed towards consumption,
production of intermediate inputs, and investment in R&D.
Yt = Ct +NtX + µtη (4)
14Only one firm can hold a patent over a certain variety. Hence, whenever m ≥ 1 firms innovate the
same idea, m − 1 of them make a wasteful duplicative innovation. Each entrant makes an innovation, so
the total number of innovations is µt. The total number of useful innovations equals the total number of
new varieties, (1 − e−θt)νt. Thus, the fraction of innovations which represent wasteful duplication of effort
is simply 1− (1− e−θt)/θt.
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2.5 Balanced Growth Path
Our analysis focuses on the BGP of the economy, where output, consumption, varieties,
ideas, and the mass of entrants all grow at constant (but possibly different) rates. Denote
the growth rate of any variable x along the BGP by gx. It is straightforward to establish
that output, varieties, consumption, entry into R&D, and the stock of ideas all grow at the
same rate along the BGP. Namely, g ≡ gY = gC = gN = gµ = gν = (1− e−θ)(M − 1), where
θ is the value of the market tightness along the BGP.15 As in BSM Yt, Ct, Nt, and µt all grow
at the same rate. In our model, the mass of ideas, νt, also grows at this rate. In fact, the
expansion of νt is the ultimate source of growth in the economy. Due to learning, innovation
today increases the mass of ideas in the future. This permanently reduces the severity of the
coordination problems and subsequently the cost of securing a monopoly position.16 This
lower cost in turn induces higher entry into R&D up to the point where congestion reaches
its BGP level. Furthermore, the fraction of foregone innovation, e−θ, directly impacts the
growth rate, as only innovated ideas at time t contribute to the expansion of νt+1.
It is convenient to solve the model by looking at the stable ratios θ, ν
N
and C
N
. From the
law of motion of ideas and varieties, and from gN = gν , it follows that
ν
N
= M − 1. Next,
the resource constraint implies that
C
N
=
1 + λ
λ
pi − ηθ(M − 1) (5)
Lastly, we can use the fact that gC = gν , the Euler equation, the law of motion for νt, and
the free entry condition to find an implicit solution for the market tightness.
η =
(1− e−θ
θ
) βpi
1 + (1− e−θ)(M − 1)− β (6)
Even though we cannot explicitly solve for θ, it is straightforward to establish that the
solution is unique. Intuitively, as θ increases the market for ideas gets more congested and
15A proof is available upon request.
16The average cost of securing a monopoly position is η/Pr(monopoly) = ηθ/(1−e−θ), which is decreasing
in νt.
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each firm’s chance of becoming a monopolist decreases. At the same time, higher market
tightness implies a higher growth rate. This, in turn, increases the rate with which firms
discount future profit streams and as a consequence decreases the value of holding a patent.
Both of these effects decrease the incentives to enter the R&D sector when the market
tightness is high and vice versa.
3 Second-Best Allocation
This section examines the planner’s second best allocation — the planner chooses the optimal
BGP allocations subject to the coordination frictions in the market for ideas. Without loss
of generality, we impose symmetry in the intermediate varieties, i.e. Xt(n) = Xt(n
′) for
any varieties n and n′. Thus, the planner faces the problem of choosing production of
varieties, consumption, a mass of varieties, a mass of ideas, and the market tightness in
order to maximize welfare subject to the resource constraint, the laws of motion for ideas
and varieties, and the coordination frictions.
max
{Ct,Xt,θt,Nt,νt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtlnCt
AL1−λNtXλt = NtXt + Ct + ηθtνt (7)
Nt+1 = Nt + (1− e−θt)νt (8)
νt+1 = νt + (1− e−θt)(M − 1)νt (9)
Maximizing with respect to Xt yields the usual solution for varieties X
∗ := Xt =
(λA)1/(1−λ)L. As in BSM the difference between the planner’s solution and the decentralized
outcome comes from the monopoly pricing of intermediate goods. Let pi∗ = X∗(1 − λ)/λ
denote the implied per period monopoly profits at efficient level of intermediate varieties.
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Then, the rest of the first order conditions are
[Ct] : β
Ct
Ct+1
=
φt+1
φt
(10)
[Nt+1] : ht = ht+1 + φt+1pi
∗ (11)
[νt+1] : λt = λt+1
(
e−θt+1 + (1− e−θt+1)M
)
+ ht+1(1− e−θt+1)− φt+1ηθt+1 (12)
[θt] : η = e
−θt
(ht
φt
+
λt
φt
(M − 1)
)
(13)
where φt, ht, λt are the multipliers associated with (7), (8), and (9), respectively. From (10)
and (11), it follows that
ht
φt
= β
Ct
Ct+1
(
pi∗ +
ht+1
φt+1
)
(14)
The above equation characterizes the planner’s valuation of varieties: the value of a
variety equals the discounted sum of per period profits, pi∗, and the continuation value
ht+1/φt+1. There are only two differences as compared to the DE — the level of profits is
higher and the planner chooses a different tightness.
The value of an idea is the discounted sum of several terms.
λt
φt
= β
Ct
Ct+1
(
− ηθt+1 + (1− e−θt+1)
(ht+1
φt+1
+
λt+1
φt+1
(M − 1)
)
+
λt+1
φt+1
)
(15)
First, there is the dividend, −ηθt+1, which represents the average cost of R&D per idea. It
captures the intuition that unlike other assets, which carry positive returns, an idea is only
valuable if it is innovated. Hence, the planner finds it costly to keep a stock of ideas because
it diverts resources away from consumption and into R&D. The second term represents the
capital gain from innovation — the probability an idea is innovated, (1 − e−θt+1), times
the social benefit from innovating. This benefit is the value of the extra variety, ht+1/φt+1,
plus the value of the extra ideas that would be added to the pool because of innovation,
λt+1/φt+1(M − 1). Lastly, the idea carries its continuation value λt+1/φt+1.
The frictions in our model are linked to two externalities, which are illustrated in equation
(13). First, the congestion externality manifests through the difference in the fraction of
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socially and privately beneficial innovations. The planner finds the marginal entry beneficial
only if the firm is the sole inventor, i.e. with probability e−θt . Firms, on the other hand,
value entry even if they duplicate an innovation, as long as they receive the patent for it.
In particular, due to the business-stealing effect, the probability of a privately beneficial
innovation is (1 − e−θt)/θt > e−θt . Hence, the congestion exterlaity induces firms to over-
invest in R&D as compared to the SB.17 Second, there is the learning externality — firms
cannot appropriate the benefit of any ideas that come about from their innovations, so
they do not value them.18 The planner, on the other hand, does because they permanently
alleviate future coordination problems. Specifically, more innovation today increases the
amount of future research avenues, which allows the economy to innovate more varieties
without increasing the congestion problems. Thus, the extra ideas permanently reduce the
cost of discovering new varieties.19 As a result the learning externality creates incentives for
firms to under-invest as compared to the SB.
It is straightforward to establish that along the BGP the SB allocations are characterized
by20
( ν
N
)SB
= M − 1 (16)(C
N
)SB
= pi∗ − ηθSB(M − 1) (17)
1 + (1− e−θSB)(M − 1) = β
(
1 +
pi∗
η
e−θ
SB
+ (1− e−θSB − θSBe−θSB)(M − 1)
)
(18)
The difference between the SB solution for the market tightness, (18), and the DE one, (6),
comes from the aforementioned externalities. To see this clearly, let us define the implied
17The business-stealing effect in the model is a consequences of firms’ choice of R&D project and the
coordination frictions inherent in this decision. It is thus different than the business-stealing effect examined
in the previous literature (see, for example, Corriveau (1994) and Corriveau (1998)).
18This externality is similar in spirit to the inter-temporal spillover effects present in previous models
(see, for example, Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Grossman and Helpman (1991)). In the
present paper, the externality operates through the market for ideas — the planner values ideas because
they alleviate the coordination problems in the economy.
19The average cost of discovering one new variety is η/Pr(sole inventor) = ηeθt , which is decreasing in
the mass of ideas.
20A proof is available upon request.
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rate of return in the DE by
r :=
Ct+1
βCt
− 1 = pi
η
(1− e−θ
θ
)
(19)
which is nothing but the rate of return on a unit investment in R&D — pi is the flow of
profits and (1− e−θ)/θ is the probability of securing a monopoly position. The implied rate
of return in the SB represents the social rate of return on a unit of investment on R&D and
is defined by
rSB :=
CSBt+1
βCSBt
− 1 = e−θSB
(pi∗
η
− θSB(M − 1)
)
+ (1− e−θSB)(M − 1) (20)
First, the planner eliminates the monopoly distortion, so the flow of profits is pi∗. Second,
she values the marginal innovation only when the firm is the sole inventor, which occurs
with probability e−θ
SB
. In that event, the net return is given by the normalized profits,
pi∗/η, less the normalized “storage cost” of the new research avenues, θSB(M − 1). Third,
each innovation increases the mass of ideas, so the permanent decrease in future congestion
yields the return of (1− e−θSB)(M − 1).
In BSM the externalities can be eliminated by using a subsidy on the purchases of inter-
mediate goods. In our model such a subsidy is still necessary to eliminate the dead-weight
loss from monopoly and the appropriability externality, but it is not sufficient to achieve the
SB. This is due to the congestion and learning externalities. To implement the SB, the plan-
ner needs to impose a tax on the entry into R&D. This is because the congestion externality
is larger than the learning one, so the over-investment effect of the former dominates the
under-investment effect of the latter. In particular, suppose that the government imposes a
subsidy on the purchases of intermediate varieties at a rate s and a tax on R&D activities
at a rate τ . Furthermore, if the government keeps a balanced budget through the means of
lump-sum transfers, then the optimal policy is summarized below.
Proposition 2. The optimal subsidy on the purchase of intermediate varieties is given by
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s∗ = 1− λ. The optimal tax rate on R&D entry is given by
τ ∗ =
βpi∗(1− e−θSB)
ηθSB(e−θSB + (1− e−θSB)M − β) − 1
Furthermore, τ ∗ > 0 because the magnitude of the congestion externality is larger than that
of the learning externality.
A proof is included in Appendix C. The optimal subsidy, s∗, is the same rate as in
BSM. Unlike in BSM, however, this subsidy needs to be supplemented by a tax on R&D
investment. The optimal tax rate is devised such that firms internalize the inefficiencies
associated with the frictions in our model. Lastly, even though it is optimal to impose a tax
on R&D spending, it may be the case that the decentralized economy suffers from under-
investment, i.e. θ < θSB. This is due to the appropriability externality. Whether or not
there will be under-investment in equilibrium depends on parameter values.
4 The Impact of Coordination Frictions
4.1 Decentralized Economy
A goal of the analysis is to study the impact of coordination frictions in our economy. To
this end we compare the DE’s BGP to the BGP of a hypothetical CE. In particular, the
only difference between the latter economy and the DE one is that firms can coordinate their
research efforts at stage two of the innovation process.21 Let superscript c denote the value
of any variable in the CE along the BGP. Evidently, when firms can coordinate their research
efforts, all research avenues are undertaken and subsequently all ideas are innovated. At the
same time, the CE may feature a positive fraction of wasteful duplication of effort due to
the usual “over-grazing” problem.22 However, this waste, ωc, is smaller than the one in the
DE. Furthermore, this is the case, even though the CE features a higher market tightness.
21The proof of Proposition 3 explicitly defines the process of coordination.
22For a survey of the literature see, for example, Reinganum (1989).
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Proposition 3. In the coordination economy all ideas are innovated and the growth rate
equals M − 1. Furthermore, ω > ωc and θ < θc.
A proof is included in Appendix C. Intuitively, when firms can coordinate their R&D
activities all ideas are innovated because each of them represents an opportunity to gain a
profitable monopoly position. Thus, in the CE there is no foregone innovation. This, results
in a higher growth rate as compared to the DE. Because of this the foregone innovation
in the DE generates a general equilibrium effect which induces firms to tolerate a higher
congestion than firms in the CE. In particular, the lower growth rate increases the stochastic
discount factor, which in turn raises the value of holding a patent. Since, in both economies,
the probability of making a wasteful innovation is simply the probability of not receiving a
patent, it follows that ω > ωc.
Moreover, θ < θc, even though the DE features a higher fraction of wasteful simultaneous
innovation. This is the case because, for a given market tightness, the coordination frictions
reduce an entrant’s chance of securing a monopoly position. In particular, the probability of
securing a patent in the DE for a given tightness θ˜, (1− e−θ˜)/θ˜, is only a fraction 1− e−θ˜ of
the one in the CE, 1/θ˜. As firms cannot coordinate their efforts, in the DE only a fraction
1 − e−θ˜ of ideas are patented. Thus, even though the number of patent applications per
idea, θ˜, is the same in both economies, in the DE there are relatively less patents to be
distributed among innovators. This decreases each entrant’s chance of securing a monopoly
position and subsequently reduces the incentives to enter the R&D sector. This is true even
though the DE features a higher value of holding a patent. In other words, the decrease in
the probability of securing a patent dominates the increase in the net present value of profits,
ultimately reducing incentives to enter the R&D sector and decreasing the market tightness.
Furthermore, the effect on the market tightness provides an indirect channel through which
the presence of foregone innovation reduces the growth rate in the DE. A lower tightness
decreases each idea’s chance of being innovated which results in a lower aggregate mass of
innovation.
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4.2 Planner’s Allocation
To highlight the impact of coordination frictions in the planner’s allocation we compare
the BGP in the SB to that in the FB. In the FB the planner can directly assign firms to
projects. Thus, it is straightforward to establish that θFB = 1 and that the FB does not
feature any foregone innovation, nor any wasteful duplication of effort.23 Thus, it is readily
observable that the frictions amplify both the fractions of foregone and wasteful innovation.
Unlike in the decentralized case, however, the coordination failure does necessarily reduce
the research intensity in the economy. This is so because in the SB the planner faces a trade-
off when deciding on the market tightness (as depicted in equation (13)). On the one hand,
a higher tightness increases congestion and subsequently the cost of wasteful innovation,
η× Pr(duplication of effort) = η(1− e−θt). On the other hand, a higher tightness decreases
the fraction of foregone innovation. The benefit from this decrease is given by the probability
the marginal firm is the sole inventor, e−θt , times the the social benefit of the innovation net
of the entry cost, η. Thus, the planner chooses θSB that, on the margin, strikes a balance
between these two opposing effects. In the FB, however, she faces no such trade-off so the
decision of setting the market tightness is independent of the parameters which govern the
welfare costs of wasteful duplication of effort and foregone innovation.
5 Numerical Exercise
We gauge the importance of the frictions in our model for growth and welfare through the
means of a numerical exercise. Our calibration matches key moments of the U.S. economy
and is set at annual frequency. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.95, the productivity
parameter, A, and labor supply, L, are both normalized to unity. We set the markup to
17.43% (λ = 0.8516) to match the average R&D share of non-farm GDP, ηµt/Yt = 3.1194%,
for the period between 1966 and 2011.24 To calibrate η and M we use two additional
23Furthermore, (ν/N)FB = M − 1, (C/N)FB = pi∗ − η(M − 1), and gFB = M − 1. A proof is available
upon request.
24The data on non-farm GDP is in 2009 chained dollars and taken from NIPA table 1.3.6. The data on
nominal R&D expenditures is from NIPA table 5.6.5 and includes private fixed investment in R&D (including
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moments. First, we match the average growth rate of non-farm GDP for the same period of
1.7546%. Second, in our model the ratio of patent grants to patent applications is (1−e−θ)/θ.
Matching this fraction to its empirical counterpart, 0.60957, results in a market tightness
θ = 1.0876.25 Together these two moments yield η = 0.1715 and M = 1.0265.
The calibrated DE features a fraction of wasteful innovation ω = 39%. This is about
25% larger than that in the CE, ωc = 31%, even though θ is about 25% smaller than
θc = 1.4491. At the same time the DE features a large fraction of research avenues which are
not undertaken — 33.7%. This implies that the growth rate is about 2/3 of the CE growth
rate gc = 2.65%. Eliminating the frictions generates a welfare gain of 13% in consumption
equivalent terms.26 About 10.35pp of the gain is due to the increased growth rate and the
rest is due to the reduction in the fraction of wasteful innovation.
The DE exhibits too little innovation — the SB market tightness, θSB, is 1.7154. Thus,
in the SB the percentage of innovations which represent a wasteful duplication of effort,
ωSB, is 52%. The SB features a fraction of uninnovated research avenues of 18%. While this
is still quite sizable, it is about half of that in the DE. As a consequence, the SB growth
rate (of 2.17%) is considerably larger than the one in the DE. Eliminating the frictions in
the planner’s allocation results in a 16.15% welfare gain. Of this 5.6pp is the gain due to
eliminating the fraction of foregone innovation and the rest is due to eliminating the fraction
of wasteful innovation.
The relative welfare costs of foregone innovation and wasteful duplication of effort are
different in the decentralized equilibrium and the planner’s allocation. This is the case
because of two reasons. First, the planner chooses θSB which, on the margin, strikes a
balance between these two welfare costs. As a result the fraction of foregone innovation in
the SB is much smaller. Thus, eliminating this fraction leads to a relatively smaller welfare
gain. Second, eliminating the frictions in the DE does not fully eliminate the fraction of
software). To obtain the series on real R&D investment, we deflate the nominal series using the implicit
GDP price deflator from NIPA table 1.1.9.
25The data is taken from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The data on patent grants is by year of
application.
26A detailed explanation of the welfare calculations is included in Appendix A.
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wasteful innovation. In particular, since the CE features wc = 31%, the reduction in the
waste is only 8pp. On the other hand, if the planner could achieve the first-best, then all of
the waste would be eliminated, leading to a reduction of 52pp.
Insert Figure 1 here
To explore the robustness of the quantitative results, we repeat the numerical exercise
for different calibrated values of the DE market tightness, θ. Two alternative calibration
strategies allow us to discipline the analysis. First, we turn to estimates on the return
to R&D expenditure from the existing literature.27 The majority of these estimates are
consistent with a rate of return for the U.S. economy between 20% to 40%. This yields a
market tightness θ ∈ [0.6471, 1.8039].28 Second, we use firm-level data on patents to estimate
the elasticity of the probability of securing a monopoly position with respect to the mass
of R&D firms, −(1 − e−θ − θe−θ)/(1 − e−θ). This yields θ ≥ 1.29 We consider the interval
θ ∈ [1, 1.8], which is consistent with both calibration strategies.
Figure 1 illustrates the quantities of interest for the different values of the calibrated
market tightness. The welfare gain is substantial for all considered values — it is at least
4.7% for the decentralized economy and 10.8% for the planner’s allocation (Figure 1d).
Furthermore, the gain is decreasing in the calibrated value of the tightness. Intuitively,
higher θ implies a lower fraction of foregone innovation, e−θ, which in turn decreases the
difference between the CE and DE growth rates, gc−g = e−θ(M−1). At the same time, the
reduced growth rate gap implies that the amplification in the fraction of wasteful innovation,
(ω − ωc) is smaller. Both of these effects serve to mitigate the impact of the coordination
frictions and as a consequence the welfare gain from eliminating these frictions. The intuition
27For a survey see, for example, Hall et al. (2010).
28The return to R&D investment in our model is given by
∂Yt+1
∂Rt
=
( g
ηµt/Yt
) θe−θ
1− e−θ
As the growth rate, g, and the R&D share of GDP, ηµt/Yt, are matched to the aggregate data, the above
allows us to match the tightness, independent of other model parameters.
29Further details are in section six.
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for the case of the planner’s allocation is slightly different and it serves to explain why the
welfare gain decreases relatively less than the gain in the decentralized case. Firstly, a higher
calibrated market tightness implies a lower parameter value for the entry cost, η, and for
the number of new ideas generated per new variety, M . Thus, the planner finds it optimal
to set a higher SB market tightness, since innovation is cheaper and the net present value
of implied profits higher. However, this increase is relatively smaller than the corresponding
increase in θ. Thus, the response in e−θ
SB
and the SB growth rate is relatively smaller. At
the same time a higher θSB leads to a larger fraction of wasteful duplication of effort, ωSB.
This effect puts an upward preassure on the welfare gain as θSB increases. Nonetheless, the
welfare cost of wasteful innovation decreases because of the lower entry cost and ratio of
ideas to varieties, (νt/Nt)
SB. The resulting net effect on the welfare gain due to eliminating
wasteful innovation is negative. Yet, this effect is smaller than the one in the DE and as a
result the welfare gain in question is larger for all considered values of θ.
Lastly, we explore the robustness of the quantitative results in an extension of our baseline
model. In particular, our augmented model features uncertainty in the innovation process
and endogenous firm-level research intensity. Upon choosing a direction for their effort, R&D
firms decide on an intensity i and incur the cost φi (φ > 0). The amount of effort devoted
affects their probability of successfully innovating the idea according to Pr(success) = 1−e−γi
(γ > 0). The welfare cost of frictions in this extension is virtually the same as in the baseline
model, so the results are presented in Appendix B.
6 Empirical Analysis
We use firm-level panel data on patents in order to test the hypothesis that ideas are scarce
and to provide an alternative estimate of the market tightness. If firms do face a common pool
of scarce research avenues, then we should expect to see firms simultaneously developing the
exact same innovation relatively often. If they do not, then simultaneous innovation should
be a rare occurrence. Indeed, the phenomenon of simultaneous innovation is well documented
in the literature. For example, Lemley (2011) details anecdotal evidence that virtually every
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major historical innovation (such as the cotton gin, the steam engine, the computer, and
the laser) has been simultaneously innovated by several groups of researchers. Cohen and
Ishii (2005) find that a positive fraction of patents for the period between 1988 and 1996
were declared in interference.30 In a more recent example, Siemens applied for a patent for a
positron emission tomography scanner on April 23, 2013 (application number 13/868,256).
Most claims are rejected because Philips (application number 14/009,666 filed on March 29,
2012 and application number 14/378,203 filed on February 25, 2013) had simultaneously
made similar innovations.31 In another recent case Google Inc. filed a patent application on
November 1 2012 (number 13/666,391) for methods, systems, and apparatus that provide
content to multiple linked devices. All twelve claims contained in the application are rejected
because of simultaneous innovations made by Yahoo! Inc. (application number 13/282,180
with filing date October 26, 2011), Microsoft Corporation (application number 13/164,681
with filing date June 20, 2011), and Comscore Inc. (application number 13/481,474 with
filing date May 25, 2012).32
Our analysis takes a different, complementary approach from the one in the aforemen-
tioned literature. We estimate the resulting increase in the congestion due to an increase
in the number of innovators. If ideas are indeed scarce, then an increase in the number of
firms would suggest that, on average, more innovators apply for the same patent and, as a
consequence, each of them has a lower probability of securing that patent. If ideas are not
scarce, then we would expect the marginal entrants to work on distinct projects and as a
result not observe any change in firms’ probability of securing a patent. Furthermore, our
approach allows us to recover the market tightness from the empirical estimates.
30Patents are declared in interference if two innovators file for the same patent within three months of
each other (six months for major innovations).
31The information on the patent applications is taken from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent
Application Information Retrieval. Philips’s applications were made public on January 23, 2014 and January
15, 2015. Siemens’ patent application was rejected on September 10, 2015. The examiner rejected most claims
under 35 U.S.C. 103 citing the two patent applications in the text, as well as a patent held by the National
Institute of Radiological Sciences in Japan (patent application number 12/450,803).
32Yahoo! Inc.’s application was made public on May 2, 2013, Microsoft’s application was made public
on December 20, 2012, and Comscore Inc.’s application was made public on December 20, 2012. Google’s
patent application was rejected on November 20, 2014. The examiner rejected the application under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. 103(a) citing the three patent applications in the text.
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6.1 Empirical Methodology
We augment the empirical model of the patent production function (see, for example, Hall
et al. (1986) and Fabrizio and Tsolmon (2014)) to account for the number of innovators as
captured by the aggregate number of patent applications. If ideas are scarce, then a higher
aggregate number of patent applications would reduce each firm’s probability of securing
a patent and, controlling for firm-level quality and quantity of patent applications, each
firm’s number of patents granted. In addition, we control for the number of patents in force
because of two reasons. First, an increase in the aggregate number of patent applications
does not necessarily imply a higher market tightness, instead it might simply be a response
to a higher mass of ideas. Thus, motivated by the cumulative nature of knowledge, we use
past innovation, captured by the number of patents in force, as a proxy for the current
stock of research avenues. Second, patents might have a strategic aspect that allows their
owner to block rivals from innovating, and subsequently patenting related innovations.33
Since a higher number of patent applications in the aggregate translates to a higher number
of patents, we include the number of patents in force to ensure that the estimated effect
captures only the congestion we are interested in and not the reduction in the number of
patents because of the aforementioned strategic effect. Since firm-level data on the quantity
and quality of patent applications is not available, we proxy for these using a set of firm-level
controls.
As the number of patents granted to each firm is a count variable, we estimate the fol-
lowing equation using the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (Wooldridge, 1999):
E[Pi,t|It] = exp
[ LApps∑
i=0
βi∆ln(Appst−i) +
LPatsInForce∑
i=0
γi∆ln(PatsInForcet−i)
+ αi + t+
k∑
j=1
Lj∑
i=0
δj,iXj,t−i
]
(21)
where Pi,t is the number of successful patent applications filed by firm i at time t, ∆ln(Appst)
33See, for example, Bessen and Meurer (2006), Hall et al. (2014), and Choi and Gerlach (2017).
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is the growth rate of aggregate patent applications at time t, ∆ln(PatsInForcet) is the growth
rate of the number of patents in force at time t, Xj,t represents firm-level controls, and
αi represents firm-level fixed effects. LApps and LPatsInForce denote the maximum lags of
∆ln(Appst−i) and ∆ln(PatsInForcet−i) included in the estimation.
We include the growth rate of Appst, rather than its natural log because of unit root
considerations.34 The equation includes lags of ∆ln(Appst) to account for the patent grant
lag observed in the data. In particular, the relevant mass of rivals that work on the same
ideas simultaneously is all firms that apply for a patent after the original innovator but
before she has received the patent.35 Since only 28.26% of all patents granted in the U.S.
between 1976 and 2006 have a grant lag of less than two years, the appropriate measure
should include Appst and Appst−1. In contrast, most of the successful patent applications
filed at time t − 2 or earlier were granted by time t, so we do not include further lags in
the measure of the mass of innovators. Nonetheless, we do include ∆ln(Appst−2) in the
regression equation for robustness and to capture any possible learning not absorbed by the
number of patents in force. Thus, LApps is set to two. This implies that
LApps∑
i=0
βi∆ln(Appst−i) = β0∆ln(Appst) + β1∆ln(Appst−1) + β2∆ln(Appst−2)
= β0ln(Appst) + (β1 − β0)ln(Appst−1) + (β2 − β1)ln(Appst−2)
The coefficient β1 captures the relevant congestion in the market — the percentage response
of E[Pi,t|It] to a one percent increase in the relevant mass of innovations, (Appst+Appst−1).
Thus, the null hypothesis that ideas are not scarce corresponds to β1 = 0. Through the lens
34An augmented Dickey-Fuller test on ln(Appst) over the period 1964 − 2014 yields a test statistic of
1.813 with a 10% critical value of −2.6, whereas the same test on ∆ln(Appst) over the period 1965 − 2014
yields a test statistic of −5.991 with a 1% critical value of −3.587.
35If the original innovator has received a patent prior to the application filing date of a rival, then the
change in the number of patents by the rival may represent learning or strategic blocking. Also, if the
rival observes the patent prior to filing her application then there is the chance that she made a purposeful
imitation of an existing innovation rather than an unintentional simultaneous innovation. Furthermore, prior
to November 2000 the USPTO did not have a policy of making most patent applications public. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that firms which apply for a patent at time t do not observe pending patent applications
filed prior to t and as a result cannot learn from nor purposefully imitate the innovations described in these
applications.
25
of our model, we can interpret β1 as the elasticity of the probability of securing a monopoly
position, (1 − e−θ)/θ, with respect to the mass of R&D firms, µt. To see this clearly,
observe that we can decompose the average number of successful patent applications as
E[Pi,t|It] =Pr(grant)×Applicationsi,t = ((1− e−θ)/θ)×Applicationsi,t, where Applicationsi,t
is the number of firm’s innovations, i.e. patent applications which are of high enough quality
to warrant a patent. As the firm-level quantity and quality of applications is independent of
the aggregate number of patent applications, it follows that β1 = −(1−e−θ−θe−θ)/(1−e−θ).
This relationship allows us to recover θ from the empirical estimates.
Lastly, we include lags of PatsInForcet to better proxy for the mass of ideas. For consis-
tency, the equation includes the growth rate of PatsInForcet rather than its natural log.
36
The number of lags, LPatsInForce, is set to six.
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6.2 Data and Variables
To construct the sample we start with the NBER Patent Data (Hall et al. (2001), HJT
henceforth) which consists of 3, 279, 509 unique patent-assignee observations and covers all
utility patents granted by the USPTO between 1976 and 2006. To mitigate truncation
problems, we drop all applications filed prior to 1975 and post 2002. Additionally, after
dropping all observations for which information on assignees is not available, the sample
size reduces to 2, 550, 892 observations. We use this sample to calculate the total number of
patents per year of patent application filling date per assignee. The data is then matched with
Compustat using the unique company identifier, gvkey. This results in a panel of 11, 957 firms
covering 333, 193 observations and 1, 061, 995 patents. After dropping observations which
have missing firm-level control variables there remain 49, 913 observations on 5, 901 firms
and 967, 820 patents. Lastly, we drop 609 observations with only one firm-year observation
36Also, there is strong evidence that ln(PatsInForcet) contains a unit root. Its first difference appears
to be I(0), however. As the series appears to have a prominent break in its level, we apply a Zivot-Andres
unit root test (Zivot and Andrews, 1992) to ∆ln(PatsInForcet) for the period of 1965− 2014. The minimum
t−statistic is −5.111 while the 5% critical value is −4.80.
37Table 8 in Appendix D shows the results for different values of LPatsInForce. The benchmark estima-
tion does not include lags of ∆ln(PatsInForcet) higher than sixth, since they are insignificant and do not
significantly affect the estimates of β1.
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and 1, 335 firms (7, 783 observations) which have zero total patents in the sample years. This
results in a data set of 41, 566 observations covering 966, 688 patents by 3, 957 firms.
Insert Table 1 here
Table 1 describes the variables we use and their sources. The dependent variable in
the regressions, NumPatsi,t, is the count of patented inventions by firm and year of patent
application. The firm-level controls include current and one-period-lagged natural log of (i)
firm’s real expenditures in R&D, ln(R&D)i,t; (ii) company size, measured by the total number
of employees, ln(Emp)i,t; (iii) firm’s real value of property, plant, and equipment, ln(PPE)i,t;
(iv) firm’s real net sales, ln(Sales)i,t. We deflate all real variables using the implicit GDP
deflator. The aggregate number of patent applications, Appst represents all utility patent
applications submitted to the USPTO. We take the data on the numbers of patents in force,
PatsInForcet, from the USPTO Historical Patent Data Files (Marco et al., 2015). Tables 6
and 7 in Appendix D provide summary statistics for the key variables, and the correlations
of firm-level variables.
6.3 Empirical Results
The benchmark estimates (Table 2, column (1)) provide strong support in favor of the
hypothesis that ideas are scarce. The coefficient β1 is negative and highly significant. More-
over, the results are robust to including further lags of ∆ln(Appst) (Table 2). Including the
third and fourth lags does not affect the significance of β1, although its magnitude increases
slightly. The results are also robust to changes in the firm-level controls (Table 3). The
significance of the coefficient of interest, β1, does not change and its point estimate varies
only slightly. This is true even in column 1 where we do not include any firm-level controls.
The results are robust to reasonable changes in the sample period as well (Table 4). In all
cases considered β1 remains negative and significant and its magnitude changes by only a
little. Overall, the results suggest the point estimate of the market tightness is around θ = 3
and the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is around θ ≥ 1.
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Insert Table 2 here
Insert Table 3 here
Insert Table 4 here
As a last robustness check, we estimate the elasticity by patent category. To this end, we
construct the variables NumPatsCatji,t, for j = 1, . . . , 6, which represent the total number of
successful patent applications in technological category j filed in year t by firm i. Our decom-
position uses the classification in HJT, where the six technological categories are “Chemical”,
“Computers & Communications”, “Drugs & Medical”, “Electrical & Electronic”, “Mechan-
ical”, and “Others”. Table 5 presents the results. Column 1 is the benchmark specification
and each of the other 6 columns uses NumPatsCatji,t as the dependent variable. The results
provide further support for the hypothesis that research avenues are scarce. The coeffi-
cient β1 is negative and significant at the 5% level for all categories except “Chemical” and
“Mechanical”.
Insert Table 5 here
It should be noted that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no data on the total number
of patent applications filed within a year in a given technological category. Thus, in each
specification we have to use the total number of patent applications. Hence, it is plausible
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis in these two categories because of data limitation.
Another plausible explanation is that most firms in these industries do not rely on patents
to secure a monopoly position, but instead resort to other mechanisms such as secrecy or
complexity. If this is the case, then patents do not capture most of the innovations made
in these categories, and as a consequence most of the congestion. Survey data from Cohen
et al. (2000), in particular, favors this explanation.38
38When asked for what percentage of product innovations are patents considered an effective property
rights protection mechanism the average response across all manufacturing firms is 34.83%. The response of
firms in the “Food” and “Textiles” industries (both in HJT subcategory 11 of the “Chemical” technological
category) is 18.26% and 20%, respectively. The response of “Mineral Products”, “Metal”, and “Steel”
(subcategories 51 and 52 of HJT “Mechanical”) is 21.11%, 20%, and 22%, respectively. Thus, if these
industries do not find patents as effective it stands to reason that they do not rely heavily on patents.
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7 Conclusion
We develop an expanding-variety endogenous growth model in which firms direct their in-
vestment towards a specific research avenue (out of a scarce mass of potential R&D projects),
but cannot coordinate their efforts. Due to the coordination frictions, the equilibrium num-
ber of firms which innovate the exact same idea is a random variable with mean given by the
tightness in the market for ideas. Because of the frictions in our model, a fraction of research
avenues remain uninnovated. This foregone innovation reduces the growth rate which in turn
generates a general equilibrium effect that amplifies the fraction of wasteful simultaneous in-
novation. Furthermore, these frictions reduce the equilibrium level of research intensity.
Implementing the second-best allocation in our model requires the government to impose a
tax on R&D investment. This is because the two externalities affected by the frictions in
our model, the congestion and learning ones, are such that the incentives to over-invest due
to the former dominate the incentives to under-invest due to the later.
Our paper gauges the impact of coordination frictions on the growth rate and welfare.
Eliminating the coordination failure in the decentralized economy results in a 13% welfare
gain, whereas the gain in the planner’s allocation is 16.15%. Furthermore, the majority of the
welfare gain is due to eliminating the welfare cost of foregone innovation in the decentralized
case and due to eliminating the welfare cost of wasteful simultaneous innovation in the
planner’s allocation.
We also analyze firm-level data on patents granted between 1976 and 2006. The data
strongly favor the hypothesis that research avenues are scarce. Moreover, our empirical
analysis provides an estimate of the market tightness and subsequently allows us to discipline
the numerical analysis in the paper.
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8 Appendix
8.A Appendix A: Welfare Comparison
We follow Akcigit et al. (2016) and compare the welfare difference between any two economies
A and B in consumption equivalent terms. In particular, consider the welfare in economy
A, WA, and economy B, WB, along their BGPs. Suppose at time t = 0, both economies
start at the same initial position with NA0 = N
B
0 . Now, welfare in economy i is given by
W i =
∞∑
t=0
βtlnCit = ln
(
(1 + gi)
β
(1−β)2Ci
1
1−β
0
)
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Then, let αA,B measure the fraction with which initial consumption in economy A, CA0 , must
be increased for consumers to have the same welfare as people in economy B. Thus, α is
given by
αA,B = e(1−β)(W
B−WA) − 1
This measure of welfare is used throughout the text. In particular, the welfare gain from
eliminating frictions in the DE is given by αDE,CE and the gain from eliminating frictions in
the planner’s allocation is given by αSB,FB.
We decompose the welfare gain from eliminating frictions into the gain from eliminating
foregone innovation and the gain from eliminating wasteful innovation. The welfare gain from
eliminating foregone innovation in the DE is given by αDE,DEF , where DEF is a hypothetical
decentralized economy that features no foregone innovation but the same level of wasteful
innovation as the DE. In particular, gDEF = gc, CDEF0 /N0 = pi(1+λ)/λ−ηθDEF (M−1), and
θDEF = βpi/(η(1+gDE−β). Thus, the welfare cost of wasteful innovation in the decentralized
economy is given by αDE,CE−αDE,DEF . Similarly, the welfare cost of foregone innovation in
the SB is given by αSB,SBF , where SBF is a hypothetical allocation in which the planner can
assign firms to projects but has to keep the fraction of wasteful innovation as in the SB. In
particular, gSBF = gFB, CSBF0 /N0 = pi
∗−ηθSBF (M−1), and θSBF = θSB/(1−e−θSB). Thus,
the welfare cost of wasteful duplication of effort in the SB is given by αSB,FB − αSB,SBF .
8.B Appendix B: Augmented Model
We explore the robustness of the quantitative results from section five in an extension of
our baseline model. The economy in this extension features uncertainty in the innovation
process and endogenous research effort intensity. In the interest of consistency, the only
difference with the baseline model is in the innovation sector. At stage one firms still enter
at a cost η > 0 and at stage two firms still choose a direction for their R&D effort. However,
now at stage three entrants choose a research intensity i which affects their probability of
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successfully innovating. In particular, the cost of exerting effort i is φi and the probability
of successfully innovating the chosen project is 1− e−γi, where φ, γ > 0. Stage four is as in
the baseline model.
8.B.1 Decentralized Economy
The final good sector and the final stage of the innovation process are as in the baseline
model. Hence, Pt(n) = 1/λ and Xt(n) = X. At stage three, firms choose effort i that
maximizes the expected reward from the R&D stage, Rt(i) ≡ Pr(patent)Vt − φi. Since
Pr(patent) = Pr(success)Pr(patent|success) = (1− e−γi)Pr(patent|success), it follows that
the optimal research effort solves
Pr(patent|success)Vt = φ
γ
eγj (22)
where j is the level of research effort in a symmetric equilibrium. The second stage is
analogous to the one in the baseline model, except now there is a chance firms are not
successful in innovating. Let the effective market tightness be denoted by θ˜t ≡ (1− e−γj)θt.
Then, it is straightforward to establish that the number of firms that successfully innovate
a particular idea follows a Poisson distribution with mean θ˜t.
39 Thus, the probability of
receiving a patent conditional on innovating is given by Pr(patent|success) = (1− e−θ˜t)/θ˜t.
Hence,
1− e−θ˜t
θ˜t
Vt =
φ
γ
eγj (23)
Free entry implies that η = R(j). Thus,
η + φj =
φ
γ
(eγj − 1) (24)
which yields an implicit solution for the equilibrium research intensity j.
The laws of motion for varieties and ideas are analogous to the baseline model, with the
39A proof is available upon request.
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only exception that now the probability an idea is innovated is given by 1 − e−θ˜t . Hence,
ν/N = M − 1 and g = (1− e−θ˜)(M − 1). Furthermore, consumers face the same problem as
in the baseline model. Thus, Vt = βpi/(1 + g − β). Using the economy’s resource constraint
and (24) it follows that along the BGP
C
N
=
1 + λ
λ
pi − θ˜(M − 1)φ
γ
eγj (25)
Finally, using (23) and the expression for Vt, it follows that the effective market tightness
solves
βpi
1 + (1− e−θ˜)(M − 1)− β =
φ
γ
eγj
θ˜
1− e−θ˜ (26)
8.B.2 Coordination Economy
As in the baseline version of the model, the only difference between the DE and the CE is
that at stage two of the innovation process — in the CE, a Walrasian auctioneer coordinates
firm’s research efforts. Thus, Pt(n) = 1/λ and Xt(n) = X. Next, as in the DE, the optimal
research effort in equilibrium solves
Pr(patent|success)V ct =
φ
γ
eγj (27)
Then, let us focus on stage two. Whenever there are µt < νt firms in the R&D sector, the
auctioneer assigns a unique idea to each firm and Pr(patent|success) = 1. When θc ≥ 1,
however, the auctioneer distributes firms to ideas as equally as she can, subject to assigning
integer number of firms to each research avenue. In the event that l ≥ 1 firms successfully
innovate the same idea, they each receives the patent with probability 1/l.40 For example,
if θc = 8.2, then a fraction 0.2 of ideas are matched with 9 firms and a fraction 0.8 of ideas
are matched with 8 firms. Thus, a fraction 1.8/8.2 of firms face 8 rivals and a fraction
6.4/8.2 face 7. In general, a fraction dθce(θc−bθcc)/θc of firms face bθcc rivals and a fraction
40This process of coordination is different from the one in the baseline model where innovation is certain,
so the auctioneer can effectively assign patents to entrants. This is because firms do not innovate for sure in
our augmented model.
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bθcc(dθce − θc)/θc face bθcc − 1, where bxc is the largest integer less than x and dxe is the
smallest integer larger than x. Hence,
Pr(patent|success) =bθ
cc(dθce − θc)
θc
bθcc−1∑
l=0
(bθcc − 1
l
)
(1− e−γj)le−γj(bθcc−1−l) 1
l + 1
+
dθce(θc − bθcc)
θc
bθcc∑
l=0
(bθcc
l
)
(1− e−γj)le−γj(bθcc−l) 1
l + 1
=
dθce − θc
(1− e−γj)θc (1− e
−γjbθcc) +
θc − bθcc
(1− e−γj)θc (1− e
−γjdθce) (28)
The case relevant for out numerical exercise is θc ≥ 1, so we restrict our attention to it.
Next, free entry and (27) imply that
η + φjc =
φ
γ
(eγj
c − 1) (29)
which yields the same equilibrium research effort as in the DE.
The laws of motion for varieties and ideas is the same as in the DE with the exception
that now the probability an idea is innovated is given by (θc − bθcc)(1− e−γjcdθce) + (dθce −
θc)(1− e−γjcbθcc). The consumer’s optimization problem yields V ct = βpi/(1− β + gc), where
gc = (θc−bθcc)(1−e−γjcdθce)+(dθce−θc)(1−e−γjcbθcc)(M−1). Lastly, the resource constraint
and the expression for the value of holding a patent yield
(C
N
)c
=
1 + λ
λ
pi − θc(M − 1)(η + φjc) (30)(
dθce − θc
(1− e−γj)θc (1− e
−γjbθcc) +
θc − bθcc
(1− e−γj)θc (1− e
−γjdθce)
)−1
φ
γ
eγj
c
=
βpi
1− β + gc (31)
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8.B.3 Second-Best Allocation
Analogously to the baseline model, the planner solves
max
{Ct,Xt,θ˜t,Nt,νt,j}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtlnCt (32)
AL1−λNtXλt = NtXt + Ct + θ˜tνt
η + φj
1− e−γj (33)
Nt+1 = Nt + (1− e−θ˜t)νt (34)
νt+1 = νt + (1− e−θ˜t)(M − 1)νt (35)
The first order condition with respect to Xt yields Xt = X
∗ as in the baseline model.
Furthermore, the first order condition with respect to the research effort, j, yields
η + φjSB =
φ
γ
(eγj
SB − 1) (36)
which is the same level of research effort as in the DE. Let η˜ ≡ φeγjSB/γ, hence, the rest of
the first order conditions are
[Ct] : β
Ct
Ct+1
=
φ˜t+1
φ˜t
(37)
[Nt+1] : ht = ht+1 + φ˜t+1pi
∗ (38)
[νt+1] : λt = λt+1
(
e−θ˜t+1 + (1− e−θ˜t+1)M
)
+ ht+1(1− e−θ˜t+1)− φ˜t+1η˜θ˜t+1 (39)
[θ˜t] : η˜ = e
−θ˜t
(ht
φ˜t
+
λt
φ˜t
(M − 1)
)
(40)
where φ˜t, ht, and λt and the multipliers associated with (33), (34), and (35), respectively.
Thus, the planner’s problem reduces to the one in the baseline model. Hence,
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( ν
N
)SB
= M − 1 (41)(C
N
)SB
= pi∗ − η˜θ˜SB(M − 1) (42)
1 + (1− e−θ˜SB)(M − 1) = β
(
1 +
pi∗
η
e−θ˜
SB
+ (1− e−θ˜SB − θ˜SBe−θ˜SB)(M − 1)
)
(43)
8.B.4 First-Best Allocation
Without loss of generality we impose symmetry in the production of varieties and the research
effort intensity. Observe that by symmetry the planner assigns the same number of firms per
idea. Hence, the probability an idea is innovated is given by 1− e−γj˜t , where j˜t = jθt is the
effective research effort per idea. Now, the planner can achieve an additional unit of effective
research by either increasing θt by 1/j units or increasing j by 1/θt units. Furthermore, the
cost of the former is νtφ + νtη/j units of the final good and the cost of the latter is νtφ.
Thus, it is always cheaper to induce higher effective research effort by increasing the research
intensity, j. Hence, θFB = 1. Then, the planner’s problem reduces to
max
{Ct,Xt,Nt,νt,j}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtlnCt (44)
AL1−λNtXλt = NtXt + Ct + νtη + νtφj (45)
Nt+1 = Nt + (1− e−γj)νt (46)
νt+1 = νt + (1− e−γj)(M − 1)νt (47)
The first order condition for Xt implies that the level of intermediate varieties is still given
by X∗. Taking the rest of the first order conditions and applying straightforward algebra
yields
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(C
N
)FB
= pi∗ − (η + φjFB)(M − 1) (48)
φ
γ
eγj
FB
=
βpi∗
1− β + gFB +
β2pi∗(1− e−γjFB)(M − 1)
(1− β + gFB)(1 + gFB)(1− β) −
β(η + φjFB)(M − 1)
(1 + gFB)(1− β) (49)
where gFB = (1− e−γjFB)(M − 1).
8.B.5 Numerical Exercise
As in the baseline case, we calibrate the model at annual frequency, so the discount factor is
set at β = 0.95. Furthermore, we normalize γ = L = A = 1. To calibrate η, M , and λ we use
the same three moments as in the baseline case. In addition, we set the elasticity of firm-level
output with respect to R&D investment at 0.05. This value is consistent with most firm-level
estimates for the U.S.41 The elasticity in our model is given by γje−γj/(1− e−γj), hence, the
equilibrium research effort of firms is j = 4.5139.42 Setting the R&D share of GDP to its
empirical value yields λ = 0.8516, as in the baseline model. Next, the fraction of patents
to patent applications is (1− e−θ˜)/θ˜. Matching this expression to its empirical counterpart
yields θ˜ = 1.0876. Hence, θ = 1.0997. Lastly, setting g = (1− e−θ˜)(M − 1) = 1.7546% and
using (24), (26) yields M = 1.0265, η = 0.1611, and φ = 0.0019. The resulting welfare cost
of coordination frictions in the DE is 12.76% and in the SB is 15.97%.
Insert Figure 2 here
As in the baseline model, we explore the robustness of our quantitative results by varying
the effective market tightness in the interval θ˜ ∈ [1, 1.8].43 The magnitude of the welfare
costs is virtually the same as in the baseline model for all considered values of θ˜ (Figure 2).
41For a survey see Hall et al. (2010).
42In our model firm-level output corresponds to O(c˜) ≡ (1 − e−γc˜/φ)(1 − e−θ˜)Vt/θ˜, where c˜ ≡ φj is the
firm’s R&D investment.
43In our augmented model the two alternative calibration strategies set the bounds on θ˜. In particular the
return of R&D is now given by ∂Yt+1/∂Rt = gθ˜e
−θ˜/((1− e−θ˜)ηµt/Yt) and the elasticity of the probability
of securing a monopoly position with respect to the mass of R&D firms is −(1− e−θ˜ − θ˜e−θ˜)/(1− e−θ˜).
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8.C Appendix C: Proofs Omitted from the Text
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. We follow previous literature (see, for example, Julien et al. (2000)) and threat the
mass of entrants, µt and ideas, νt, as finite. Then the resulting equilibrium outcome is
evaluated at the limit as µt, νt →∞ (keeping θt constant), so as to characterize the behavior
in a market with continuum of firms and ideas.
First, by assumption, the firm’s probability of securing a monopoly position given that
there are exactly n rivals, Pr(monopoly|n) = 1/(n+1). In a symmetric equilibrium all firms
place the same probability si of directing their effort towards a particular idea i. Then, the
chance that a firm would face exactly n rivals is
Pr(n) =
(
µt − 1
n
)
sni (1− si)µt−1−n
Hence, the probability of securing a monopoly position is given by
Pr(monopoly) =
µt−1∑
n=0
Pr(monopoly|n)P (n) =
µt−1∑
n=0
(
µt − 1
n
)
sni (1− si)µt−1−n
1
n+ 1
=
=
1
µt
µt−1∑
n=0
(
µt
n+ 1
)
sni (1− si)µt−1−n =
1
µtsi
(
µt∑
n=0
(
µt
n
)
sni (1− si)µt−n − (1− si)µt
)
=
1− (1− si)µt
µtsi
Next, we show that sk = sj for all k, j ∈ νt. Suppose not. Then, there exists some k, j
such that sk > sj. But for any i ∈ νt, we have that
∂Pr(monopoly)
∂si
=
µ2t si(1− si)µt−1 − µt[1− (1− si)µt ]
(µtsi)2
For any si ∈ (0, 1), it follows that Pr(monopoly) is decreasing in si if and only if (1 −
si)
µt−1 < Pr(monopoly) which clearly holds since µt ≥ 2. Now, for si = 1, we have that
∂Pr(monopoly)/∂si = −1/µt < 0. Furthermore, it is easy to see that limsi→0 ∂Pr(monopoly)/∂si =
−(µt − 1)/2 < 0. Hence, Pr(monopoly) is decreasing in si everywhere in its domain.
Then, sk > sj implies that Prk(monopoly) < Pr(monopoly)j, which then implies that
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Prk(monopoly)Vk,t < Prj(monopoly)Vj,t since all varieties are equally profitable. Thus,
sk > sj cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, we must have si = sj for all i, j ∈ νt. Thus,
si = 1/νt.
Then, it follows that
Pr(i is matched with exactly n firms) =
(
µt
n
)( 1
νt
)n(
1− 1
νt
)µt−n
Taking the limit as µt, νt →∞ (keeping the ratio θt constant) we get that
Pr(i is matched with exactly n firms)→ θ
n
t e
−θt
n!

Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. First, let us prove the following lemma
Lemma 1. The magnitude of the congestion externality is larger than that of the learning
externality.
Proof. First, we can decompose the difference between the planner’s valuation of the benefit
of entry and the firm’s valuation of this benefit. At the SB this difference is given by
A+ L+ C = η −
(1− e−θSB
θSB
)
V SB (50)
where A, L, and C denote the appropriability, learning, and congestion externalities; V SB :=
βpi/(e−θ
SB
+ (1 − e−θSB)M − β) is the value of having a monopoly position at the second
best level of the market tightness. The right hand side of (50) gives the difference between
the planner’s valuation of the benefit of entry, η, and the firm’s, V SB times the probability
of securing a patent. Then, one can decompose the sum of the three externalities in the
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following manner
A :=
((h
φ
)SB
− V SB
)(1− e−θSB
θSB
)
(51)
L :=
(λ
φ
)SB(
e−θ
SB
(M − 1)
)
(52)
C := −
(h
φ
)SB((1− e−θSB
θSB
)
− e−θSB
)
(53)
Thus, A is the measure of how much more would the planner value entry than the firm if
the appropriability externality was the only one in the model. L and C measure the same
difference if the only externality in the model was learning and congestion, respectively.
From equations (52) and (53), it follows that the magnitude of the congestion externality
is larger than that of the learning externality if and only if
(h
φ
)SB(1− e−θSB
θSB
)
> e−θ
SB
((h
φ
)SB
+
(λ
φ
)SB
(M − 1)
)
(54)
From equations (13) and (14), it then follows that (54) holds if and only if
(1− e−θSB)βpi∗
θSBη
> e−θ
SB
+ (1− e−θSB)M − β (55)
Next, from the planner’s solution, (18), it follows that |C| > L if and only if pi∗− ηθSB(M −
1) > 0. But this has to hold, from equation (17), as the SB must feature Ct > 0.

Now, let us turn back to the problem of implementing the SB. The government imposes
a tax on R&D activities at a rate τ and subsidizes the purchase of intermediate varieties at
a rate s. Furthermore, it keeps a balanced budget through the means of lump-sum transfers
to households in the amount Tt. Thus, the government’s budget constraint is given by
Tt =
∫ Nt
0
sPt(n)Xt(n)dn− τηµt
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The final good firm chooses labor and intermediate inputs to maximize profits, now given
by Yt−wtL−
∫ Nt
0
(1−s)Pt(n)Xt(n)dn. The first order conditions yield the same labor demand
equation as in the DE, wt = (1−λ)Yt/L, and an inverse demand function for intermediaries
given by Pt(n) = λAL
1−λXλ−1t (n)/(1− s).
At stage three of the innovation process, the monopolist faces an analogous problem as
in the DE. The only difference now is in the inverse demand function. Hence, in equilibrium,
P = 1/λ, X = [Aλ2/(1− s)]1/(1−λ)L, pi = (1− λ)X/λ, Yt = [A(λ2/(1− s))λ]1/(1−λ)LNt.
As in the economy without government intervention, all ideas are equally profitable, so
the matching technology is as in the DE. The free entry condition is now given by
η(1 + τ) =
1− e−θt
θt
Vt
where the value of the monopoly position, Vt, is defined as in the DE.
The laws of motion for ideas and varieties, and the Euler equation are as in the DE.
Hence, the value of the monopoly position is still given by (3). Furthermore, the resource
constraint is still given by (4).
Along the BGP, we still have that νt/Nt = M − 1, as the laws of motion for ideas and
varieties are as in the DE. Thus, from the resource constraint, (4) it follows that
C
N
=
1− s− λ2
(1− λ)λ pi − ηθ(M − 1)
Next, (3), the law of motion for ideas, and the free entry condition imply that
1 + (1− e−θ)(M − 1) = β
(
1 +
pi
η(1 + τ)
(1− e−θ
θ
))
Then, setting s = sSB implies that pi = pi∗ and setting τ = τ ∗ implies that θ = θSB. Thus,
C/N = (C/N)SB. Furthermore, τ ∗ is given by
τ ∗ =
βpi∗(1− e−θSB)
ηθSB(e−θSB + (1− e−θSB)M − β) − 1
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To see that the optimal tax rate is positive because the congestion externality dominates
the learning one, observe that
−C − L =
(h
φ
)SB(1− e−θSB
θSB
)
− e−θSB
((h
φ
)SB
+
(λ
φ
)SB
(M − 1)
)
=
(h
φ
)SB(1− e−θSB
θSB
)
− η
= ητ ∗
where the first equality follows from (13) and the second equality from (14) and the fact that
the SB growth rate is given by (1− e−θSB)(M − 1). Hence, |C| > |L| ⇒ τ ∗ > 0.

Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. First, let us explicitly characterize the environment in the CE. The only difference to
the DE is at the second stage in the innovation process. Coordination is achieved through
the means of a centralized allocation of firms to ideas. In particular, upon entry, a Walrasian
auctioneer directs firms’ research efforts and assigns patents in the following way. If µt ≤ vt,
then each firm is directed towards a distinct project and each firm receives a patent. If
µt > νt, the auctioneer chooses νt firms at random, assigns each a distinct project, and
grants each a patent over the corresponding variety. The rest µt − νt firms are randomly
assigned a project, but none of them receives a patent.
The assumption we have placed on the parameter vales ensures that firms find all research
avenues profitable. Hence, in equilibrium, all ideas are innovated, i.e. µt ≥ νt, and each firm
secures a patent with probability Pr(monopoly) = 1/θt. Hence, the laws of motion for ideas
and varieties are given by
νt+1 = Mνt (56)
Nt+1 = Nt + νt (57)
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Since the final good sector and the intermediate varieties production technology are
as in the DE, it follows that in equilibrium it is still the case that Pt(n) = 1/λ, X =
(λ2A)1/(1−λ)L, Yt = (λ2λA)1/(1−λ)LNt, pi = X(1 − λ)/λ, V ct =
∑∞
i=t+1 ditpi. As all ideas are
equally productive, the free entry condition is now given by
η =
1
θt
V ct (58)
Moreover, consumers face the same problem as in the DE, so the Euler equation is
analogous to (3):
V ct = β
Ct
Ct+1
(
pi + V ct+1
)
(59)
Furthermore, the resource constraint is still given by (4).
One can establish in a manner analogous to that in the DE case that have gY = gC =
gN = gµ = gν . However, now from the law of motion for ideas, it follows that gν = M − 1.
Next, using the laws of motion for ideas and varieties, it follows that along the BGP we
still have, ν/N = M − 1. Furthermore, from the resource constraint, it follows that
C
N
=
1 + λ
λ
pi − ηθc(M − 1) (60)
Lastly, using the free entry condition and the Euler equation, it follows that the market
tightness is given by
θc =
βpi
η(M − β) (61)
Next, we can compare the percent of wasteful innovations in the two economies. In the
CE there are µt innovations and νt of those are beneficial. Hence, ω
c = 1 − 1/θc. Then,
observe that Vt > V
c
t because the DE growth rate, (1 − e−θ)(M − 1), is always smaller
than the CE growth rate, M − 1. Then, using the two free entry conditions, it follows that
ω = 1− η/Vt > 1− η/V ct = ωc.
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Next, from (61) it follows that
θc
1− e−θ =
βpi
η(M − β)(1− e−θ) >
βpi
η(1 + (1− e−θ)(M − 1)− β) =
θ
1− e−θ (62)
where the inequality follows because β < 1⇒ 1 + (1− e−θ)(M − 1)− β > (M − β)(1− e−θ).
Hence, θc > θ. 
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8.D Appendix D: Figures and Tables from the Text
47
(a) Wasteful Innovation (b) Foregone Innovation (c) Growth Rate
(d) Welfare Gain
(e) Welfare Gain: Decentralized
Economy
(f) Welfare Gain: Planner’s Al-
location
Figure 1: Alternative Calibration Values
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Figure 2: Welfare Gain in the Augmented Model
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Table 1: Variable Description and Sources
Variable Description Level Data Source
Endogenous Variables
NumPatsi,t Count of patented inventions by application year Firm NBER Patent Data
Exogenous Variables
Deflatort Implicit GDP deflator Aggregate U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (NIPA Table 1.1.9)
Appst Total utility patent applications Aggregate USPTO (U.S. Patent
Statistics Chart Calendar
Years 1963− 2015)
PatsInForcet Number of patents in force Aggregate USPTO (Historical Patent
Data Files)
NomR&Di,t Nominal private R&D expenditures Firm Compustat
NomSalesi,t Nominal net sales Firm Compustat
Empi,t Number of employees Firm Compustat
NomPPEi,t Nominal gross value of property, plant, and equipment Firm Compustat
R&Di,t (Real) Private R&D expenditures Firm 100×NomR&Di,t/Deflatort
Salesi,t (Real) Net sales Firm 100×NomSalesi,t/Deflatort
PPEi,t (Real) Gross value of property, plant, and equipment Firm 100×NomPPEi,t/Deflatort
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Table 2: ∆ln(Appst) Lags table
(1) (2) (3)
∆ln(Appst−1) −0.875∗∗∗ −0.971∗∗∗ −1.001∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.271) (0.278)
∆ln(Appst−3) No Yes Yes
∆ln(Appst−4) No No Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes
Applications Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
PatsInForce Yes Yes Yes
N(Firms) 3, 957 3, 957 3, 957
N 41, 566 41, 566 41, 566
χ2 704.3 732.1 772.2
Controls indicates the inclusion of ln(R&Di,t), ln(Salesi,t), ln(Empi,t), ln(PPEi,t), and their first lags. PatsInForce
indicates the inclusion of the growth rate of patents in force and its first six lags. Applications indicates the inclusion of
∆ln(Appst) and ∆ln(Appst−2). Robust standard errors, clustered by firm are in parentheses.∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3: Firm-Level Controls Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ln(Appst−1) −0.863∗∗∗ −0.873∗∗∗ −0.875∗∗∗ −0.752∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.220) (0.216) (0.203) (0.204)
ln(R&Di,t), ln(Salesi,t), ln(Empi,t), ln(PPEi,t) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln(R&Di,t−1), ln(Salesi,t−1), ln(Empi,t−1), ln(PPEi,t−1) No No Yes Yes Yes
ln(R&Di,t−2), ln(Salesi,t−2), ln(Empi,t−2), ln(PPEi,t−2) No No No Yes Yes
ln(R&Di,t−3), ln(Salesi,t−3), ln(Empi,t−3), ln(PPEi,t−3) No No No No Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PatsInForce Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N(Firms) 6, 247 4, 333 3, 957 3, 508 3, 089
N 173, 778 46, 234 41, 566 37, 232 33, 585
χ2 354.5 577.0 704.3 706.5 788.7
PatsInForce indicates the inclusion of the growth rate of patents in force and its first six lags. Applications indicates the
inclusion of ∆ln(Appst) and ∆ln(Appst−2). Robust standard errors, clustered by firm are in parentheses.∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4: Sample Period Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ln(Appst−1) −0.875∗∗∗ −0.776∗∗∗ −0.884∗∗∗ −0.839∗∗∗ −0.747∗∗∗ −0.777∗∗∗ −0.735∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.221) (0.229) (0.214) (0.214) (0.220) (0.220)
Sample 1975− 2002 1975− 2001 1975− 2000 1976− 2002 1977− 2002 1976− 2001 1977− 2000
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PatsInForce Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N(Firms) 3, 957 3, 776 3, 541 3, 879 3, 790 3, 698 3, 374
N 41, 566 39, 278 37, 038 40, 187 38, 804 37, 901 34, 286
χ2 704.3 664.8 682.3 680.3 660.9 662.2 673.8
Controls indicates the inclusion of ln(R&Di,t), ln(Salesi,t), ln(Empi,t), ln(PPEi,t), and their first lags. PatsInForce
indicates the inclusion of the growth rate of patents in force and its first six lags. Applications indicates the inclusion of
∆ln(Appst) and ∆ln(Appst−2). Robust standard errors, clustered by firm are in parentheses.∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Patents By Technological Category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ln(Appst−1) −0.875∗∗∗ 0.0711 −1.946∗∗∗ −0.936∗ −0.578∗ −0.245 −0.586∗
(0.216) (0.221) (0.353) (0.447) (0.287) (0.230) (0.278)
HJT All Chemical Computers & Drugs & Electrical & Mechanical Others
Category Communications Medical Electronic
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
PatsInForce Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N(Firms) 3, 957 1, 734 1, 932 1, 215 1, 898 1, 813 1, 869
N 41, 566 22, 397 22, 463 14, 632 24, 726 24, 270 24, 586
χ2 704.3 226.4 1036.9 285.5 502.7 315.0 235.9
Controls indicates the inclusion of ln(R&Di,t), ln(Salesi,t), ln(Empi,t), ln(PPEi,t), and their first lags. HJT designates
the technological category as defined in Hall et al. (2001). PatsInForce indicates the inclusion of the growth rate of
patents in force in the corresponding technological category and its first six lags. Applications indicates the inclusion of
∆ln(Appst) and ∆ln(Appst−2). ∆ln(Appst−3) and ∆ln(Appst−4) are also included in the estimation of column (4).
Robust standard errors, clustered by firm are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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8.E Appendix E: Supplementary Tables
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N N(Firms) Mean SD Min Median Max
Aggregate Variables
∆ln(Appst) 28 N/A 0.042 0.052 −0.084 0.045 0.121
∆ln(PatsInForcet) 28 N/A 0.013 0.024 −0.017 0.008 0.072
Firm-Level Variables
NumPatsi,t 41, 566 3, 957 23.257 120.708 0 1 4, 344
ln(R&Di,t) 41, 566 3, 957 2.112 2.224 −6.468 2.041 9.359
ln(Salesi,t) 41, 566 3, 957 5.226 2.546 −6.283 5.160 12.356
ln(Empi,t) 41, 566 3, 957 0.103 2.257 −6.908 −0.023 6.809
ln(PPEi,t) 41, 566 3, 957 4.394 2.595 −3.468 4.131 12.981
Sample period: 1975− 2002
56
Table 7: Correlations
Variables NumPatsi,t ln(R&Di,t) ln(R&Di,t−1) ln(Salesi,t) ln(Salesi,t−1) ln(Empi,t) ln(Empi,t−1) ln(PPEi,t)
NumPatsi,t 1.000
ln(R&Di,t) 0.378 1.000
ln(R&Di,t−1) 0.382 0.977 1.000
ln(Salesi,t) 0.321 0.743 0.749 1.000
ln(Salesi,t−1) 0.317 0.726 0.741 0.984 1.000
ln(Empi,t) 0.323 0.748 0.753 0.960 0.951 1.000
ln(Empi,t−1) 0.322 0.738 0.754 0.955 0.958 0.991 1.000
ln(PPEi,t) 0.337 0.774 0.786 0.941 0.937 0.947 0.946 1.000
ln(PPEi,t−1) 0.334 0.757 0.778 0.935 0.940 0.940 0.949 0.992
Sample period: 1975− 2002. N = 41, 566. All values are significant at the 0.1% level.
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